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DYNAMIC INCENTIVES IN THE SPORT OF KINGS
Abstract
Can the reputational incentives that arise in a dynamic setting mitigate standard agency
problems, as Fama (1980) suggests?  We examine this issue using data from the horse
racing industry, where trainers have an incentive to devote more effort to horses they
own themselves, but in doing so run the risk that horses owned by clients will be
transferred to other stables in the future.  We find that client-owned horses perform
significantly better than trainer-owned horses on average, suggesting that reputational
incentives are strong. Moreover, the magnitude of this performance premium increases
with the potential importance of trainer reputation.  These results suggest that
reputational incentives can play a powerful role in disciplining behaviour.
1DYNAMIC INCENTIVES IN THE SPORT OF KINGS
1.  Introduction
A fundamental axiom of economics is that financial incentives are important. Although supporting
empirical evidence has been limited due to data constraints, several recent studies suggest that
individuals do indeed respond to explicit incentives such as piece rates, bonus plans and profit
sharing, e.g., Groves et al (1994), Lazear (2000), McMillan et al (1989).  However, not all such
incentives are benign.  In the standard agency setting, financial considerations can lead to shirking
and/or a transfer of resources from principal to agent, e.g., Gruber and Owings (1996).    
In contrast to explicit incentives, virtually nothing is known about the power of implicit
incentives that arise in a dynamic setting.  Fama (1980) and Telser (1980) suggest that the need to
maintain a good reputation, thereby protecting future income, can motivate workers and other
agents to exert optimum effort, thereby reducing or eliminating agency problems.  However,
subsequent theoretical work has cast doubt on the general validity of this proposition.  In formal
models of agent behavior, Holmstrom (1999) and Prendergast (1999) show that effort remains
inefficient even when dynamic consequences are fully taken into account; in particular, old agents
still choose too little effort while young agents do the opposite.  Moreover, Meyer and Vickers
(1997) demonstrate that dynamic incentives can be counter-productive if greater effort changes
principal expectations in a way that hurts the agent.  Nevertheless, the full effects of dynamic
incentives are likely to be more complex than is allowed for in these models, so their overall
effectiveness in disciplining agent behavior remains an empirical question.
Empirical work has primarily focused on the effects of possible life-cycle variation in the
importance of dynamic incentives.  For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) report that young
mutual fund managers are more likely to be sacked for poor fund performance than their older
counterparts, consistent with the reputation of the former being more sensitive to recent events.
Similarly, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find that CEO compensation contracts are more
performance-sensitive for older workers.  However, while such studies are important for showing
that employment contracts vary in ways that are consistent with a world in which reputational
incentives are strong, they are unable to say much about the extent to which these incentives
actually influence behaviour.
2        In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on this issue by examining a novel example of an
agency problem: the potential conflict of interest between owners and trainers in the horse racing
industry.  This setting has unique advantages: not only is the response to incentives
unambiguously measured by horse success, but also the necessary data are publicly available, in
contrast to other service professions where reputation is potentially important (e.g., accountancy,
law, plumbing and building).  And, most importantly,  unlike the standard employment situation
where managers and workers have a single employer, most trainers prepare horses for a number
of owners, with each horse having a unique ownership structure.  This feature allows us to
examine the link between incentives and performance while holding trainer characteristics
constant.
Static and dynamic incentives arise from the singular nature of the owner-trainer
relationship.  In return for preparing a horse for racing, trainers receive a fixed fee from owners
plus a proportion (10% in our sample) of horse winnings.  However, they also train horses on
their own account, from which they receive 100% of winnings.  Such an arrangement creates an
obvious incentive for trainers to divert effort and overall training quality from horses owned by
outside clients to horses owned by themselves, particularly given the difficulties faced by outside
owners in monitoring and assessing trainer inputs.  In doing so, however, trainers run the risk of
losing future income as client owners become dissatisfied with their horses' performance and
consequently transfer them to another stable.
By comparing the success of horses that are trainer-owned with those that are not, our data
allow us to explicitly identify the difference in performance between, on the one hand, an expert
acting on behalf of a client and, on the other hand, the same expert acting on his own behalf, in a
situation where both static and dynamic incentives exist and work in opposite directions.  Thus, we
can provide a direct assessment of the power of dynamic incentives.
These incentives appear to be strong.  On average, client-owned horses perform 20%
better than trainer-owned horses, even after controlling for relevant horse and trainer
characteristics.  While this finding could be due to factors unrelated to dynamic incentives, our
main results suggest otherwise.  For example, dynamic incentives should be strongest for trainers
who are most reliant on their training activities for income purposes, Consistent with this
prediction, the 'performance-premium' of client-owned horses is indeed significantly greater for
such trainers.
3Our analysis and results are closely related to several other studies of incentives and
agency problems.  Lazear (2000) and Gaynor et al (2004) report that employees and experts
respond positively to explicit incentives that affect their current income; our results show that
implicit incentives affecting future income can also be important.  Levitt and Syverson (2005) and
Rutherford et al (2005) compare real estate sales in which the agent acts on behalf of a client with
sales where the agent is the seller, and find that agent-owned houses sell for approximately 4%
more than others after differences in house characteristics are accounted for.  However, because
real-estate sales are typically one-shot deals, dynamic incentives are essentially non-existent in
these transactions; our work suggests that they can be an important disciplinary device.  Finally,
Hubbard (1998) finds that private inspectors are more likely to let a vehicle pass an emissions test
than government inspectors, despite the former having an incentive to fail vehicles in order to
obtain the subsequent repair work.  This seems likely to be driven by a desire for repeat business
and is thus an example of dynamic incentives at work; our results show that these can even be
sufficiently strong to induce agents to put principals' immediate interests ahead of their own.
In the next section, we outline a model that formalises the dynamic incentives facing horse
trainers and obtain some testable predictions. Section 3 describes our data sources and some of its
properties, while section 4 contains the majority of our results.  Section 5 provides some
concluding remarks.
2.  A simple model of trainer effort allocation
If a trainer exerts effort e then a horse has winnings
w = a + be + x,
where a and b are constants and x is a zero-mean random variable with distribution function F
(and density function f).  We assume that trainers are paid a flat fee of h if they train a horse
which they do not own, and receive all the horse’s winnings from horses they do own.  In
addition, the trainer receives the certain income stream Lt from activities unrelated to training.
There are two seasons - the present (time 0) and the future (time 1) - and realisations of
x are independent across these two dates.  Any client-owned horse prepared by a trainer in the
current season must have winnings exceeding some threshold -w if the trainer is to be retained
4(and receive the fee h) for next season.  That is, if the trainer exerts effort e into training a horse
which he does not own, then he gets to train the horse next season if and only if
a + be + x ≥ -w  ⇔ x ≥ -w - a - be.
This occurs with probability
1 - F( -w - a - be).
To keep things simple, consider the situation of a trainer with two horses, one of which
he owns while the other is owned by someone else.  He has total effort 1 able to be allocated to
training each season, and et is the effort allocated to his own horse in season t. Assuming the
flat fee structure, he will optimally set e1 = 1 regardless of whether he trains one or two horses
next season.  Then his income levels in each of the two seasons are:
I0  =  (a + be0 + x0 + h) + L0
I1  =  (a + b + x1 + h) + L1 with probability 1 - F(
-w - a - b(1-e0))
     =  (a + b + x1) + L1 with probability F(
-w - a - b(1-e0))
The trainer's choice of effort eo is governed by a utility function U(I).  If next season’s
expected utility is discounted by the factor δ, his expected utility from the two seasons is
E0[U(a + be0 + x0 + h + L0)] + δF( 
-w - a - b(1-e0))E1[U((a + b + x1) + L1)]
+ δ(1 - F( -w - a - b(1-e0)))E1[U((a + b + x1 + h) + L1)]
where Et[.] denotes current expectations about xt.  This is maximized by choosing e0 such that:
E0[U'((a + be0 + x0 + h) + L0] - δ∆ f(
-w - a - b(1-e0)) = 0
E0[U''((a + be0 + x0 + h) + L0] - δ∆ f'(
-w - a - b(1-e0)) < 0
where ∆ ≡  E1[U((a + b + x1 + h) + L1)] - E1[U((a + b + x1) + L1)] > 0.
5The first-order condition reveals a simple tradeoff between static and dynamic
concerns.  On the one hand, the trainer has an incentive to allocate effort to his own horse this
season, since he receives 100% of its winnings.  On the other hand, too little effort allocated to
the client-owned horse this season makes it unlikely that its winnings will reach the threshold
-w, and therefore unlikely that he will receive the fixed fee h next season.  Note that if -w = 0,
then the latter condition disappears and the trainer sets e0 = 1.  However, the optimal e0 is
decreasing in -w, so e0 < 1 for 
-w > 0.  For high enough -w, e0 < 1/2, and the trainer allocates
more effort to the outside horse.  Since expected performance is increasing in effort, we have:
Claim 1:  The performance difference between trainer- and client-owned horses is negative if
and only if reputational concerns are sufficiently weak.
Claim 1 states that we can infer the relative strengths of static and dynamic incentives by
comparing the racecourse performance of trainer-owned horses with that of client-owned
horses.  If the former group do better than the latter, then static incentives dominate dynamic
considerations, and vice versa.
Of course, even if trainer-owned horses perform better than their client-owned
counterparts, this need not mean that dynamic incentives are non-existent. Differentiating the
first order condition with respect to δ shows that
∂e0
∂δ  = 
∆f( -w - a - b(1-e0))
b{E0[U''((a + be0 + x0 + h) + L0)] - δ∆ f'(
-w - a - b(1-e0))}
 < 0
which says that trainers for whom the future is more important allocate relatively more effort to
horses they do not own.  One way to assess this empirically is along age dimensions: trainers
nearing retirement have fewer seasons remaining in which to earn training fees than younger
trainers, so the latter seem likely to be more concerned about the future, i..e, have a  higher δ.
This suggests:
Claim 2:  Relative to trainer-owned horses, client-owned horses perform better in the stables
of young trainers than in the stables of old trainers.
6Similarly, differentiating the first order condition with respect to L1 shows that
∂e0
∂L1
 = 
δf( -w - a - b(1-e0))(∂∆/∂L1)
b{E0[U''((a + be0 + x0 + h) + L0)] - δ∆ f'(
-w - a - b(1-e0))}
 > 0
since ∂∆/∂L1 must be negative due to U'' < 0.  This says that trainers who are less dependent
on future training income allocate relatively more effort to horses they own.  In practice,
trainers who support themselves with income from non-training sources, and thus have high
L1, are likely to manage only a small stable.  Thus:
Claim 3: Relative to trainer-owned horses, client-owned horses perform better in large
stables than in small stables.
3.  Data
Our data set contains details on every horse that competed in NZ harness races during
the 1997-98 and 2002-03 seasons.1  Starting with the first race at the first meeting of the 1997-
98 season, we record the age, sex, trainer, winnings and ownership details of the winning horse.
Using the Harness Racing New Zealand website, we then track this horse through the rest of
the season, recording performance details for each start plus any changes in trainer or
ownership.  We repeat this procedure for every other horse in the same race, then move to the
second and subsequent races at the same meeting, and so on through all meetings and races
held during the 1997-98 season.  Finally, we repeat the whole exercise for the 2002-03 season
in order to obtain two independent samples.2
In 1997-98, there were 237 meetings at which 2350 races were contested by 3448
horses who raced a total of 17708 times; for 2002-03, these figures were 232 meetings, 2350
races, 3263 horses and 18335 horse-races.  Some horses changed trainers over the season, or
had their trainer's ownership share altered.  Each such change was treated as a different horse,
leading to a final dataset of 4087 horses in 1997-98 and 3861 in 2002-03.  The respective
trainer numbers are 984 and 852.
1 The NZ racing season runs from 1 August to 31 July.
2 Only 63 horses raced in both seasons.
7Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the horses in our sample.  In both
seasons, the average horse is between four and five years old, races six or seven times, earns
$4000-$5000 for its two to three owners, and has an almost 60% chance of being male.
However, some of these characteristics vary considerably across horses: the standard
deviations for the number of races and the number of owners are almost as large as their
respective means, while the standard deviations for earnings are almost three times as large as
the corresponding means.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Our primary interest is in the relationship between trainer ownership and horse
performance.  Although we know the identity of each horse's owners, we do not know their
ownership shares.  Thus, we distinguish between horses in which the trainer has some
ownership share and those that are completely client-owned.3  The last row of Table 1 shows
that trainers have an ownership share in a little over one-third of the horses in our sample.
To measure performance, we use two variables.  The first, commonly used in the
industry itself, measures the regularity with which the horse is a place getter:
consistency ratio = 
9*number of firsts + 5*number of seconds + 3*number of thirds
number of races during season
The second measures the extent to which a horse achieves its maximum-possible earnings:
Earnings-Maximum
Earnings Ratio  = 
stake earnings during the season
sum of winning stakes from all races during season
The two performance measures are quite highly correlated, but the latter gives more weight to
high-stakes races.  This feature recognises that trainers may use their experience and
knowledge to prepare a horse for the big occasion by racing its way to fitness in lesser races.
If this strategy is successful, the horse's consistency ratio would be low, but its winning
earnings proportion would be high.
3 A finer distinction between horses in which the trainer is a part-owner and those in which he has the full
ownership share yields similar results.
8Table 2 reports the mean values of these performance measures for the two categories
of ownership outlined above.  Intriguingly, client-owned horses perform significantly better
than trainer-owned horses on average: the former are 25%-35% more consistent and 21%-33%
better at realising their potential winnings.  As trainers have a strong explicit incentive to devote
more time and effort to horses they own, these results are suggestive of powerful reputational
forces at work: horses not owned by trainers do not just do as well as trainer-owned horses,
they actually do much better.  However, other variables that potentially affect horse
performance, such as horse age and sex and trainer quality, are also correlated with trainer-
ownership in our sample, so we need to employ multiple regression models to disentangle
these effects.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
4.  Regression Analysis
We estimate regression models of the general form
Performance = a0 + a1*OUTSIDE_OWNER + ∑
i
bi*CONTROLi + ε
where OUTSIDE_OWNER = 1 if the trainer is not one of the horse's owners and zero
otherwise, and CONTROLi is a control variable that potentially influences horse performance
over the course of a season.4  We use the following controls:
Horse Age. Although young horses (two and three year-olds) lack experience, which
could be expected to worsen performance, they typically race only against
each other, thereby nullifying this effect.  Horse speed and stamina typically
declines beyond three-four years of age, so we expect our performance
measures to be inversely related to age.  In our season samples, horse age is
approximately four months greater for trainer-owned horses.
4 We do not consider race-specific determinants of performance such as barrier draw, track conditions, and race
distance, since the impact of these varies from horse to horse and, in any event, can be expected to even out
over multiple starts. However, we implicitly take acount of these variables in cases where they might be
important by subsequently restricting our analysis to horses that race at least five times during the season.
9Horse Sex. Male horses are typically more robust than females, which is likely to result
in better performance.  We therefore employ an indicator variable that is
equal to one if the horse is male and zero otherwise.
Trainer Quality. All else equal, better training will result in better performance.  To measure
trainer quality, we use average stake earnings of horses in the trainer's stable
over the previous five seasons.
Trainer quality is also an important control for another reason.  In contrast to the
assumption that is implicit in our analysis, ownership structure is a choice variable and is thus
endogenous rather than exogenous.  Trainers might therefore be expected to use their superior
information to purchase ownership only in the horses most likely to succeed.  This would
suggest that Table 2 understates the true power of reputational incentives.  However, the results
in Table 2 are also consistent with a world in which wealthy client owners, facing weaker
financial constraints than trainers, purchase the highest-quality horses who subsequently
perform best.5  One way to control for this possibility would be to include a variable
measuring the initial sales price of each horse in our sample.  Unfortunately, many horses are
sold privately (or retained by the breeder), so this information is not available.  However, client
owners possessing a valuable horse are unlikely to entrust its care to a poorly-performing
trainer, so our trainer-quality variable should help control for this endogoneity problem.6
Table 3 presents a series of regression results corresponding to different seasons,
different performance measures, and different model specifications.  In columns (1) and (3) of
each panel, we control for horse age and sex, which lowers the estimated impact of outside
ownership compared with the simple mean differences reported in Table 2.  For example, the
average improvement in consistency for horses with no trainer ownership in 1997-98 is now
0.023, compared with 0.029 in Table 2.  Nevertheless, these differences remain significant at
the 1% level or better.
In columns (2) and (4) of each panel, we add the trainer quality variable.  This has a
more substantial effect on the impact of outside ownership, with the ownership coefficient
becoming insignificant at conventional levels in one specification (although remaining highly
5 This is likely to be mitigated to some extent by the New Zealand handicapping system where races
generally involve horses of similar quality, and by our performance variables which emphasize performance
within-class rather than the class of race in which the horse races.
6 Indeed, for both seasons, the mean five-season winnings of a horse's trainer is about $90,000 greater on
average if the horse is not owned by the trainer, i.e., a client-owned horse is more likely to be in the stable
of a high-quality trainer.
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significant in the others).  On average, horses that trainers do not own are now only 12%-16%
more consistent and 9%-17% better at realising their potential winnings than trainer-owned
horses.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Although the control variables are not our primary focus, it is comforting to know that
their coefficients seem sensible.  In all specifications, male horses and horses with trainers who
have been successful in the past do better and older horses do worse.
Our samples contain a number of horses who race only a few times in their respective
seasons. In any given race, a horse may experience good or bad luck affecting its performance,
so the presence of lightly-raced horses in our data is likely to introduce significant noise into
the analysis. In case it also causes bias, we re-estimate the Table 3 models with a restricted
sample of horses that raced at least five times during the season. The results from this
procedure appear in Table 4. This increases the size and statistical significance of the
ownership variable coefficients (all are now signficantly positive at conventional levels), and
raises the R-squared values.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 provide further evidence that reputation incentives
are not just strong for horse trainers, but strong enough to induce 'over-effort' in horses owned
by outside clients.  Even after controlling for characteristics such as age, sex and trainer quality,
client-owned horses out-perform trainer-owned horses by economically significant amounts on
average, particularly when sparsely-raced horses are excluded.  
However, it is possible that our results actually reveal little about the power of
reputational incentives, perhaps because our ownership variable is correlated with some
unknown determinant of horse performance, or alternatively because of trainer 'self-selection'.
That is, individuals who put their clients' interests ahead of their own may be disproportionately
inclined to become horse trainers.7  In that case, the performance advantage enjoyed by client-
7 See Lott and Broners (1993) for discussion of a similar effect among politicians.
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owned horses would be reputation-based, but for different reasons than envisaged by Fama
(1980) or our model of section 2.  If the results above do indeed indicate strong reputational
forces at work, then the propensity of trainers to favour outside-owned horses should
systematically vary with the importance of reputation.  That is, the ownership coefficient in the
regressions above should be higher for horses that are trained by individuals for whom the
establishment and maintenance of a good reputation are most important.
Following Claims 2 and 3 above, we use trainer age and stable size as two indicators of
the importance of reputation.  Young trainers have many seasons ahead of them, so
establishment of a good reputation is important if they hope to attract clients regularly over
their career.  Trainers with large stables are likely to be most dependent on training activities
for their income and hence most concerned with maintaining a good reputation.
Although the Harness Racing New Zealand database does not report trainer age, we are
able to identify when a trainer is first licensed.8  To proxy for age, we therefore create an
indicator variable that equals one if the horse's trainer holds a professional license and has less
than 10 years experience.9  To proxy for stable size, we use the number of horses in the
trainer's stable that raced at least once during the season.  Although this is a lower bound on
actual stable size, the two should be closely related.  For both these variables, we create
interaction variables with the ownership variable and estimate regressions of the form
Performance = a0 + a1*OUTSIDE_OWNER 
+  a2*OUTSIDE_OWNER*IMPORTANCE
+ ∑
i
bi*CONTROLi  + ε
where IMPORTANCE denotes the stable size or trainer age proxy.  In these models, a1
measures the ownership effect associated with trainers who care little about reputation, while a2
measures the additional ownership effect for horses prepared by trainers who attach greater
importance to reputation.
8 The HRNZ database begins in the 1985-86 season, so it is possible that we identify some trainers as
having commenced training after that season when they in fact trained prior to it before taking a break for
one or more seasons.  Industry enquiries suggest that nny bias resulting from this problem is likely to be
small.
9 Not all trainers hold a professional license.  Others hold a 'license to train', which restricts the number of
outside-owned horses able to be trained.
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Tables 5 (full sample) and 6 (restricted sample) summarise the results of these
regressions.  In the full sample, the coefficient on the ownership variable is significantly
negative in four of the six regressions using the consistency ratio as the dependent variable,
while it is generally indistinguishable from zero in the earnings ratio regressions.  As this
coefficient now captures the effect of outside ownership for those horses with trainers who
have low values of the reputation proxies, these findings are consistent with reputational
incentives being weakest for those who care least about future income opportunities from
training.  In the restricted sample, more of the coefficients are positive, but they are
insignificant in eight of the 12 specifications.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
Stronger evidence is provided by the second row of each panel in both tables.  In all
cases, the interaction of outside ownership with stable size is positive and significant at the 1%
level or better.  That is, the performance advantage of outside-owned horses is greatest for
horses trained in stables that are most reliant on maintaining a good reputation.  Comparing
these coefficients with those on the ownership variable alone in specifications (1) and (3) in
both panels of Table 5, we see that the overall impact of outside ownership on performance is
negative for stables consisting of less than 7-10 horses and positive thereafter.  Bigger stables
place greater emphasis (at least relatively) on the interests of their clients, just as the reputation
story suggests.
The interaction of trainer age with outside ownership provides much more mixed
results.  Most of the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero, three are significantly
positive, and one is significantly negative.  One scenario consistent with this evidence is where
inexperience initially encourages some younger trainers to "try it on" (i.e., attempt to take
advantage of their owners), but also where, as time goes on and learning occurs, these trainers
are forced to either exit the industry or mend their ways.  If this were the case, then our sample
would consist of young trainers that varied considerably in their propensity to deal diligently
with the horses of outside owners, and old trainers who were far more homogeneous.  Such a
pattern would account for the lack of evidence for trainer age as a proxy for reputation.
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5.  Concluding Remarks
Can the reputational incentives that arise in a dynamic setting mitigate standard agency
problems, as suggested by Fama (1980)?  Our results in this paper suggest that such incentives
can indeed play a powerful role in disciplining behaviour, at least for agents whose future
income opportunities are potentially sensitive to their reputation status.  Although horse
trainers benefit from allocating more effort to horses that they own, the average performance of
these horses is inferior to that of horses they do not own.  Moreover, this performance
differential is significantly stronger among horses that belong to stables for which reputation is
likely to be particularly important.
Of course, it is interesting to speculate about the generality of these results and their
potential applicability to other settings.  One reason why dynamic incentives are likely to be
strong among horse trainers is the unregulated nature of the labor market in which they
operate: horses can, and do, transfer from one stable to another literally overnight.  Most labor
markets do not work like this, making future income far less dependent on reputation.  Other
expert-client markets are most similar to the trainer-owner relationship - it is usually simple
enough to fire one's accountant, lawyer or plumber - but performance is not always so easy to
observe as at the racetrack.  Nevertheless, our results provide some idea of what is possible in
the right circumstances.  Clearly, the ability of long-term reputational incentives to discipline
agents cannot simply be dismissed as a theoretical curiosity.
There remains some unresolved questions.  First, there may be unobservable
heterogeneity in trainers that our analysis has not accounted for.  For example, the trainers who
predominantly prepare their own horses may differ in a systematic way from trainers who
predominantly look after the horses of other people.  This problem also arises in the Duggan
and Levitt (2005) and Rutherford et al (2005) studies of real estate agents: their finding that
estate agents get higher prices for houses they sell on their own behalf may simply indicate that
the agents who sell their house (presumably in order to buy a better one) are predominantly the
best agents, in which case it is unsurprising that they obtain a higher-than-predicted price.  In
our case, it should be possible to get around this difficulty by constructing owned and not-
owned portfolios for each trainer and using the performance differential as the dependent
variable.  Second, there remains the deeper question of why reputational incentives are strong
for horse trainers, i.e., does a failure to invest in the development of a good reputation have
14
adverse consequences?  This would require data on the hiring-firing decisions of owners with
respect to trainers.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
This table provides summary information about the horses in our dataset.  Trainer-owned horses are those where the trainer has at least a partial
ownership share.
1997-98 2002-03
Horse Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max Min
Characteristic (Std Dev) (Std Dev)
Age 4.6 4 11 2 4.4 4 13 2
(1.6) (1.5)
Number of races 6.7 5 43 1 7.0 5 45 1
during season (5.8) (5.8)
Number of 2.6 2 10 1 2.7 2 10 1
owners (2.2) (2.3)
Season earnings ($) 4154 725 302460 0 5035 1250 396723 0
(12553) (14343)
Male (%) 59 - - - 58 - - -
Trainer-owned (%) 39 - - - 36 - - -
Table 2
Ownership and Performance I: Comparison of Means
The first two columns in each panel report the mean performance of horses in which the
trainer has an ownership stake and those in which he does not.  The third column calculates
the difference and reports the p-value (in parentheses) of a test that this is zero.
1997-98 2002-03
Variable Trainer Client Difference Trainer Client Difference
Owned Owned Owned Owned
Consistency 0.117 0.146 -0.029 0.120 0.162 -0.042
Ratio (< 0.01) (< 0.01)
Earnings- 0.089 0.108 -0.019 0.095 0.126 -0.032
Maximum (< 0.01) (< 0.01)
Earnings Ratio
Table 3
Ownership and Performance II: Regression Analysis (Full Sample)
Regressions of horse performance on ownership and horse and trainer characteristics. Client
Owner equals one if the horse is not owned by a trainer and zero otherwise.  Male equals
one if the horse is male and zero otherwise.  Trainer quality is the average stakes won by the
horse's trainer over the previous five seasons (in $00000). Terms in parentheses are p-values.
1997-98 (n = 4087) 2002-03 (n = 3861)
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Consistency Ratio
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.185 0.173 0.202 0.183
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner 0.023 0.014 0.034 0.019
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.019 -0.017 -0.024 -0.020
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.038 0.036 0.047 0.042
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trainer Quality 0.011 0.020
(0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Earnings-Maximum Earnings Ratio
Constant 0.142 0.134 0.151 0.138
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner 0.015 0.008 0.026 0.016
(0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.015 -0.013 -0.017 -0.015
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.030 0.029 0.037 0.034
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trainer Quality 0.007 0.013
(0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06
Table 4
Ownership and Performance III: Regression Analysis (Restricted Sample)
Regressions of horse performance on ownership structure and horse and trainer
characteristics for horses that have five or more starts in the season.  All variables are as
described in Table 3. Terms in parentheses are p-values.
1997-98 (n = 4087) 2002-03 (n = 3861)
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Consistency Ratio
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.247 0.235 0.225 0.207
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner 0.031 0.021 0.040 0.024
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 -0.020
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.036 0.034 0.039 0.035
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trainer Quality 0.011 0.018
(0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.13
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Earnings-Maximum Earnings Ratio
Constant 0.182 0.176 0.154 0.144
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner 0.017 0.012 0.027 0.018
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.018 -0.017 -0.014 -0.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.026 0.024 0.027 0.025
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trainer Quality 0.006 0.010
(0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09
Table 5
Ownership and Performance IV: Reputation Effects (Full Sample)
This table estimates the impact that ex-ante measures of trainer reputation have on the performance-ownership relationship.  Stable size is the
number of horses raced by the horse's trainer during the season; trainer experience equals one if the horse's trainer holds a professional license
and has less than 10 years experience.  All regressions also include the variables appearing in Tables 3 and 4, but these coefficients are not
reported.  Terms in parentheses are p-values.
1997-98 (n = 4087) 2002-03 (n = 3861)
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Consistency Ratio
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Client Owner -0.017 0.011 -0.019 -0.001 0.020 0.004
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.89) (0.00) (0.68)
Client Owner* 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
Stable Size (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner* 0.014 0.016 -0.004 -0.012
Trainer Experience (0.12) (0.08) (0.63) (0.15)
R2 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Earnings-Maximum Earnings Ratio
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Client Owner -0.015 0.007 -0.016 -0.001 0.016 0.003
(0.02) (0.20) (0.00) (0.99) (0.01) (0.66)
Client Owner* 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Stable Size (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner* 0.008 0.010 -0.002 -0.008
Trainer Experience (0.27) (0.20) (0.78) (0.24)
R2 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06
Table 6
Ownership and Performance V: Reputation Effects (Restricted Sample)
This table estimates the impact that ex-ante measures of trainer reputation have on the performance-ownership relationship for the sample of
horses that have five or more races during the season.  Variables are as described in Table 5.  All regressions also include the variables appearing
in Tables 3 and 4, but these coefficients are not reported.  Terms in parentheses are p-values.
1997-98 (n = 2155) 2002-03 (n = 2157)
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Consistency Ratio
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Client Owner -0.010 0.016 -0.015 0.008 0.027 0.013
(0.20) (0.02) (0.10) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner* 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Stable Size (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Client Owner* 0.025 0.028 -0.009 -0.016
Trainer Experience (0.02) (0.01) (0.31) (0.06)
R2 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.09
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Earnings-Maximum Earnings Ratio
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Client Owner -0.009 0.009 -0.011 0.008 0.020 0.010
(0.24) (0.10) (0.15) (0.20) (0.01) (0.12)
Client Owner* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Stable Size (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Client Owner* 0.015 0.017 -0.010 -0.015
Trainer Experience (0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.02)
R2 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.09
